The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, 2nd Edition (The MIT Press) kindle –

so if that s what you want, then this book is for you However, if you re using this for your first look at contract theory, you may well be disappointed as I am I don t credit Salanie for leaving out the technical details of the models, because he doesn t effectively convey the depth of the models in his largely intuitive treatment I m all for intuition and simplicity, but his book leaves me with questions than answers after reading it.I m browsing around on for a better book, so I thought I d write a quick rating so that other lowly beginners like me don t make the same mistake I made in purchasing this as my only textbook.On the other hand, I suppose if you want a concise overview with the sketch of most of the important contract theory models, then this might be what you re looking for. Useful A concise introduction to the theory of contracts, emphasizing basic tools that allow the reader to understand the main theoretical models revised and updated throughout for this edition The theory of contracts grew out of the failure of the general equilibrium model to account for the strategic interactions among agents that arise from informational asymmetries This popular text, revised and updated throughout for the second edition, serves as a concise and rigorous introduction to the theory of contracts for graduate students and professional economists The book presents the main models of the theory of contracts, particularly the basic models of adverse selection, signaling, and moral hazard It emphasizes the methods used to analyze the models, but also includes brief introductions to many of the applications in different fields of economics The goal is to give readers the tools to understand the basic models and create their own For the second edition, major changes have been made to chapter , on examples and extensions for the adverse selection model, which now includes thorough discussions of multiprincipals, collusion, and multidimensional adverse selection, and to chapter , on moral hazard, with the limited liability model, career concerns, and common agency added to its topics Two chapters have been completely rewritten chapter , on the theory of incomplete contracts, and chapter , on the empirical literature in the theory of contracts An appendix presents concepts of noncooperative game theory to supplement chaptersandExercises follow chaptersthroughPraise for the previous edition The Economics of Contracts offers an excellent introduction to agency models Written by one of the leading young researchers in contact theory, it is rigorous, clear, concise, and up to date Researchers and students who want to learn about the economics of incentives will want to read this primer Jean Tirole, Institut D Economie Industrielle, Universite des Sciences Sociales, France Students will find this a very useful introduction to the ideas of contract theory Salanie has managed to summarize a large amount of material in a relatively short number of pages in a highly accessible and readable manner Oliver Hart, Professor of Economics, Harvard University